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Abstract The aim of the present study is to gain more
insight into the mechanisms underlying mental practice.
The question of whether a totally novel movement may be
learned by mental practice was investigated. Healthy
young adults had to learn the abduction of the big toe
(dominant right foot) without moving the other toes or the
foot. The subjects were divided into two groups: subjects
who were absolutely unable to abduct their big toe
("absolute zero" group) and subjects who were able to
abduct their toe to some extent but showed clear room for
improvement ("already doing it" group). Two separate
experiments were executed. In the first experiment, 37
absolute-zero subjects had to practice, mentally or
physically, the target movement. In the second experiment
40 already-doing-it subjects had to improve their toe-
abduction skill. The results showed that absolute-zero
subjects could not acquire the toe-abduction movement by
means of mental practice. Only subjects who physically
practiced the target movement improved significantly.
Subjects who had some experience in the task (already-
doing-it subjects) improved significantly after mental
practice as well as after physical practice. The results
seem to indicate that it is more plausible to explain the
learning effects of mental practice in terms of a top-down
mechanism based on the activation of a central representa-
tion of the movement than in terms of a peripheral bottom-
up mechanism based on the activation of muscles.
Keywords Mental practice . Motor imagery . Motor
learning
Introduction
The term mental imagery refers to a topic in skill learning
with a long history. Richardson (1969) has described
mental imagery as all quasi-sensory or quasi-perceptual
experiences that exist in the absence of those stimulus
conditions that are known to produce genuine sensory or
perceptual experiences (Richardson 1969, pp 2–3). Mental
imagery can be performed in different modalities such as
visual, auditory, tactile, kinesthetic, olfactory, gustatory, or
any combination of these senses. A special subcategory of
mental imagery is formed by motor imagery, which refers
to the internal reproduction of a specific motor action
without any overt motor output. Mental practice is a
training method by which motor imagery is used with the
intention of improving performance, in other words it is
the imagined rehearsal of a motor act with the specific
intent of learning or improving that act.
Several studies have shown that mental practice can be
effective in optimizing the execution of movements in
athletes. Furthermore, it may help novice learners in the
acquisition of new skills. Many of these studies have been
reviewed by Feltz and Landers (1983) and Driskell et al.
(1994). They show that subjects who mentally trained for
a specific task usually displayed less improvement than
those who trained physically. However, compared with
control subjects who did not practice at all, it could be
shown that mental practice, indeed, facilitated perfor-
mance. Based on the effects of mental practice, some
investigators have proposed the use of mental practice in
neurological rehabilitation, as it may be a novel and cost-
efficient treatment tool (Fansler et al. 1985; Warner and
McNeill 1988; Page et al. 2000, 2001).
Despite an established research tradition, the theoretical
basis for the effects of mental practice remains hypothe-
tical. Several theories have been proposed to explain the
mechanisms by which mental practice may improve motor
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learning. In the following section, the two most prominent
theoretical notions will be shortly discussed: the psycho-
neuromuscular theory and the central representation
theory.
The psychoneuromuscular theory, also called the pe-
ripheral theory, is based on the observation that during
imagery of a particular movement the same muscles are
activated as during overt movement execution (Driskell et
al. 1994; Boschker 2001). It is proposed that, when a
subject is mentally practicing the execution of a move-
ment, impulses are sent to target muscles. Furthermore, it
is suggested that the same neuromotor pathways that are
involved in the execution of a specific action are activated
also during mental practice. This activation aids skill-
learning by improving the appropriate coordination
patterns as a result of the strengthening of motor programs
in the motor cortex, and by priming the corresponding
motoneurons of the muscles necessary to execute a motor
task (Mackay 1981; Magill 1998; Page et al. 2001).
The psychoneuromuscular theory is supported by a
number of studies. Jacobson (1932) was one of the first to
demonstrate an increase in muscular activity when
subjects were imagining movements. During movement
imagery, however, the magnitude of the activation was
only a fraction of the activation that took place during
actual performance, and hardly any overt motion was seen.
Also more recent studies show an increase in electromyo-
graphic (EMG) activity during imagined action (Hale
1982; Wehner et al. 1984; Jowdy and Harris 1990; Bakker
et al. 1996; Weiss et al. 1994; Livesay and Samras 1998).
In general, these studies indicate that EMG activity is
limited to those muscles that participate in the simulated
action (Magill 1998; Schmidt and Lee 1999). Furthermore,
several studies have found the EMG increase to be
proportional to the amount of imagined effort (Shaw 1940;
Wehner et al. 1984; Bakker et al. 1996). Bakker et al.
(1996), for example, have shown that imaginary lifting of
9-kg dumbbells results in more EMG activity than
imaginary lifting of 4.5-kg dumbbells. Hence, it seems
that the kinesthetic image of a motion pattern is
accompanied by the same innervation pattern as during
the motion itself.
However, at the same time, motor imagery experiments
have been performed in which EMG activity is absent
during movement imagery. Yue and Cole (1992) have
compared, in healthy subjects, the maximal voluntary
force production of the fifth digits metacarpophalangeal
joint after a training program of repetitive, maximal
isometric muscle contractions with the force production
after a mental training program that did not involve
repetitive activation of muscles. The mean abduction force
of the left (trained) digit increased 30% for the contraction
group and 22% for the imagining group, whereas a control
group showed no improvement. Hence, an increase in
force was achieved without actual repeated muscle
activation. Yue and Cole conclude therefore that the
increase in muscle strength following mental training
could not be the result of neural changes at the execution
level, but had to be attributed to higher (central) levels of
the motor system involved in planning and programming.
Jeannerod (1994) has explored the idea of a central
control theory further. He argues that actions are driven by
an internally represented goal rather than directly by the
external world. He assumes that motor imagery is part of
the motor representation and related to intending and
preparing movements. Motor representations are con-
ceived as internal models of the goal of an action, whereby
the goal is defined as the final result at which the action is
intended (Jeannerod 1995). Although motor preparation is
an entirely nonconscious process, the content of motor
images can be accessed consciously. It seems that motor
images are endowed with the same properties as those of
the corresponding motor representation, that is, they may
play the same causal role in the generation of a movement
(Jeannerod 1995).
In the last few years, a growing number of studies have
shown that many neuropsychological and physiological
similarities exist between physically executed and ima-
gined movements (Decety et al. 1991, 1993; Jeannerod
1994; Jeannerod and Decety 1995; Hall et al. 1995;
Pascual-Leone et al. 1995; Decety 1996; Decety and
Grèzes 1999; Lotze et al. 1999; Jackson et al. 2001;
Hanakawa et al. 2003). Pascual-Leone et al. (1995), for
example, have examined changes in functional brain
organization after mental practice. Subjects had to execute
a one-handed piano exercise for 5 days. The results
showed that the size of the contralateral output map for the
long finger flexor and extensor muscles increased pro-
gressively each day as the subjects practiced the task. The
increase in size of the representation was equivalent in
both physical and mental training conditions. The level of
performance in the mental-practice condition after 5 days
was equivalent to that of the physical-practice condition
after 3 days. After adding 1 physical training session at the
end of a period of 5 days of mental practice, subjects
reached the same level of performance as those who were
in the physical training group. It seems, therefore, that
mental practice has a preparatory effect on the task, which
increases the efficiency of subsequent physical training.
Furthermore, positron emission tomography (PET) and
functional magnetic resonance imagining (fMRI) show
that the cortical regions involved in the execution of a
movement are also active during motor imagery. Lotze et
al. (1999) have studied brain activation during executed
and imagined movements of the right and left hand using
fMRI. They have found that the supplementary motor area
(SMA), the premotor cortex (PMC), and the primary
motor area (M1) are equally activated during both actual
and imagined movement. The SMA and PMC play a
prominent role in the planning, generation, and execution
of more complex motor tasks (Abbruzzese et al. 1996).
The aim of the present study is to gain more insight into
the mechanisms underlying mental practice. Therefore we
focus on the question whether a totally novel movement
can be learned by mental practice. Recall that the
psychoneuromuscular theory claims that mental practice
can be explained in terms of a bottom-up effect. Mental
practice leads to peripheral activity, which provides
afferent information to the motor cortex in order to
strengthen the motor program. If this notion is correct,
totally novel movements also can be learned by mental
practice. Indeed, every imaginary movement will lead to
subtle increases in the activity of the involved muscles.
The central representation theory, however, claims that the
learning effects of mental practice may be explained in
terms of a top down effect or a central regulation. Actions
are driven by a centrally stored movement representation.
Without earlier experience in the execution of the target
movement, however, no representation is available. Thus,
if this central view is correct, a totally novel movement
cannot be learned by mental practice.
Two experiments were performed to answer the
question. Healthy adult subjects had to learn a totally
novel movement, i.e., the voluntary abduction of the big
toe of the dominant right foot without moving the other
toes or the total foot (Mulder and Hulstijn 1985a, 1985b).
The subjects were divided into two groups: subjects who
were absolutely unable to abduct their big toe, who were
termed the absolute-zero subjects, and subjects who were
able to abduct the toe, but showed ample room for
improvement, the already-doing-it subjects. In the first
experiment, the absolute-zero subjects had to practice,
mentally or physically, the target movement. In the second
experiment, the already-doing-it subjects had to improve
their skill. If the central representation theory is correct,
the absolute-zero subjects will profit from physical
practice but not from mental practice, since no stored
movement representation can be activated by imagery,
whereas the already-doing-it subjects will be able to
improve their skill also by mental practice. If the
peripheral approach is correct, it is expected that also the
absolute-zero subjects will profit from mental practice and





Thirty-seven right-footed individuals, aged 19–35 years, with no
history of foot-related diseases participated in the study (12 men, 25
women). Most of them were university students. All were unable to
abduct their big toe and therefore called absolute-zero subjects. The
study was approved by the local ethics committee. All subjects gave
written informed consent.
Procedure and apparatus
The experiment started with a pretraining measurement, 1 week
before the training sessions started. The ability to abduct the big toe
voluntarily, as well as the imagery ability and the foot dominance
were determined. The ability of mental imagery was assessed by the
Vividness of Movement Imagery Questionnaire (VMIQ; Isaac et al.
1986). The VMIQ consists of 24 items reflecting the internal
standpoint and 24 items reflecting the external standpoint. The
internal standpoint refers to the ability of a subject to imagine that
he/she performs the movement, in contrast to the external
standpoint, which refers to the ability of a subject to imagine that
somebody else is performing the movement. In the present study
only the internal imagery items were employed. A score of 72 or less
on the internal imagery items was required to be included. The used
cut-off point was based on the following rationale: all 24 items for
the internal standpoint had to be scored with a 3 (moderate capacity
to imagine the performance of a movement), a 2 (a good capacity to
imagine movement performance), or a 1 (excellent imagination of
the movement performance as lively as actual performance). Scores
of 4 (a vague and unclear image) or 5 (no image at all) were not
accepted. The four subjects who scored higher than the cut-off point
were excluded.
Foot dominance was assessed by the Waterloo Footedness
Questionnaire—Revised (Elias et al. 1998), and abduction of the
big toe was determined by measuring the range of motion (ROM)
twice. Only right-footed subjects with a ROM of zero degrees in
both measurements, indicating a total inability to abduct the big toe,
were accepted. Subjects with (even minimal) voluntary control were
excluded. The ROM was measured with the subjects sitting in a
chair, their knees flexed approx. 120°. Both feet were resting on a
sheet of paper. In order to stabilize the right foot, two laths were
fastened on the floor in an angle of 90°; the heel and the lateral side
of the foot had to be pressed against these laths. The resting position
of the big toe was measured by tracing a straight line along the
medial side of the right big toe and the first metatarsal phalangeal
joint. Subsequently, subjects were asked to abduct the toe as far as
possible, without moving the whole foot or the other toes. A second
line was traced and the angle between the first and the second line
was considered as the ROM of that measurement.
The included subjects were randomly assigned to one of three
groups: (1) a group (n=14) receiving mental practice (MP); (2) a
group (n=11) receiving physical practice (PP); and (3) a control
group (n=12) receiving no practice at all (CG).
The subjects in the MP and PP groups received two training
sessions on 2 successive days. Each training session consisted of 10
trials of 1 min. The individual trials were interspersed with rest
periods of 30 s. After 5 trials the subjects were allowed to rest for a
period of 5 min. During a session subjects had to mentally or
physically practice the abduction of the right toe.
Subjects in the PP group had to attempt to abduct their big toe. In
each session, during 10 trials of 1 min each, they had to attempt to
move their big toe outward. Subjects were free to choose the
frequency of abducting attempts, but a minimum of 10 repetitions in
every trial was required. During practice they were allowed to
visually control their attempts. Subjects in the MP group had to
close their eyes and were instructed to imagine themselves moving
their big toe outward. They could choose between closing the eyes
or being blindfolded. The abduction of the big toe had to be
imagined as vividly as possible. Subjects should almost feel their big
toe moving, but actual movement of the toe was not allowed. They
had to imagine moving the toe in the same rate as subjects in the PP
group, that is, during 10 trials of 1 min each, they had to imagine toe
movements for a minimum of 10 attempts per trial. The subjects in
the CG only underwent the pre- and postmeasurements.
Main target of the training sessions was to increase the ROM. The
ROM of subjects who physically practiced the movement, was
measured before and after each session. To prevent interference with
physical practice, the ROM of subjects in the mental practice group
was only measured before session 1 and after session 2
(postmeasurement). The postmeasurements for all groups took
place immediately after ending training session 2.
EMG
To observe whether peripheral activity was present during mental
practice, EMG activity of the m. abductor hallucis of the right foot
was recorded during the first 30 s of trial 3, 4, 8, and 9 of each
training session. During each training session, EMG activity at rest
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was measured within the first 10 s of trials 3 and 8. To determine
possible bilateral effects, the EMG activity of the left foot was also
measured. Surface EMG signals were recorded bipolarly by
ConMed 1720 disposable, surface silver–silver chloride electrodes,
with a diameter of 10 mm (ConMed, Utica, N.Y., USA). The
electrodes, with custom-built preamplifiers (×1,500) directly
mounted on the electrodes, were placed on the surface of the belly
of the m. abductor hallucis. The interelectrode distance was 20 mm
center-to-center. In order to assure the same location of the
electrodes across the two sessions, the electrode position was
marked on the skin. The subjects received no feedback about the
level of EMG output of the target muscle. The rectified EMG signal
was band-pass filtered 20 Hz to 10 kHz and rectified and smoothed
with a time constant of 25 ms. Subsequently, the signal was further
processed and filtered with a Butterworth 1-Hz filter of the second
order. The median of maximum peak EMG activities was
determined.
Statistics
Paired t-tests were used to determine whether subjects in a specific
group improved the abduction of the big toe after training sessions.
A one-way ANOVAwas used to determine whether groups differed
from each other in improvement of ROM. Finally, post hoc multiple
comparisons assessed which groups differed significantly from each
other. All tests were performed with a 95% reliability interval.
Results
None of the subjects were able to abduct the right big toe
voluntarily during the premeasurement session. All
subjects were therefore equal at the start of the experiment.
A one-way ANOVA was performed to assess whether the
three groups improved differently on the abduction of the
big toe. The test showed a significant difference in
improvement between groups (F2, 34=147.93, P<0.001).
Post hoc multiple comparisons showed that subjects in the
PP group scored higher on the ROM measurements after
the training sessions than subjects in other groups. They
improved significantly more than the subjects in the other
groups (Bonferroni and Scheffe: P<0.001). Table 1 shows
the mean ROM scores of the groups.
Paired t-tests showed that subjects in the MP group and
the control group, in contrast to the PP group, did not
significantly improve their toe-abduction skill. Moreover,
the CG and MP group did not differ from each other
concerning the ROM scores. The mean ROM scores of the
groups are presented in Fig. 1. Subjects in the PP group
improved initially in session 1 (mean 2.7°), but most
improvement was shown during session 2 (mean 3.0°).




The experiment was basically the same as experiment 1. The main
difference with the previous experiment was that only already-
doing-it subjects, that is, subjects who were able to abduct their big
toe to some extent, were included. Forty subjects aged 19–35 years
(16 men and 24 women), most student volunteers, participated in the
experiment. Criteria for inclusion were the same as in experiment 1.
Thirteen participants were randomly assigned to the MP group, 14
subjects to the PP group, and 13 to the control group. The study was
approved by the local ethics committee.
Procedure and apparatus
The same apparatus and procedure were used as in experiment 1.
Main target of the training sessions was to improve the voluntary
maximal abduction of the right big toe.
EMG
The results of experiment 1 showed no EMG activity in the m.
abductor hallucis of the left toe during practice. Therefore, only
EMG activity in the m. abductor hallucis of the right foot was
measured.
Statistics
The same analysis was used as in experiment 1. A one-way ANOVA
was used to determine whether the groups were equal at the start of
the experiment.
Table 1 Differences in range of
motion (ROM) of absolute-zero
subjects at pretest session 1 and
posttest session 2
NA, not applicable
Group Start of training End of training ROM
N Mean ROM SD Mean ROM SD Post−pre df t P
Mental practice 14 0 0 0.5 1.1 +0.5 13 −1.47 0.17
Physical practice 11 0 0 5.7 0.9 +5.7 10 −20.89 0.00
Control 12 0 0 0 0 0 NA NA NA
Fig. 1 Mean range of motion (ROM) scores of the absolute-zero
subjects, measured on the pre- and posttests of sessions 1 and 2 (S1,
S2) and on the preexperimental measurement 1 week before the
experiment started
Results
No significant differences in ROM scores existed between
the groups at the pre measurement of session 1. Therefore
the groups were equal at the start of the experiment. A
one-way ANOVA determined significant differences in
improvement of ROM between groups after training
sessions (F2, 37=13.70, P<0.001). Table 2 presents the
improvement of subjects in the three different groups.
Subjects in the PP group as well as in the MP group
were able to improve their capacity to abduct the big toe
significantly after the two training sessions. Post hoc
multiple comparisons showed that, compared with the
control group, improvement in ROM was significantly
higher in the PP group (Bonferroni and Scheffe, P<0.001)
and MP group (Bonferroni and Scheffe, P<0.05). In spite
of seemingly less improvement in the MP group, the
difference between the PP and MP group was not
significant. Subjects in the CG group showed no signif-
icant improvement at all. Figure 2 presents the mean ROM
scores of the groups across the training sessions.
EMG activity in both experiments
During training sessions no EMG activity could be
observed in the m. abductor hallucis of the right foot of
subjects in the MP group. Also, in the left foot of the
subjects in the PP and the MP groups, no EMG activity
was measured. Only physical practice caused noticeable
EMG output.
Discussion
Two theoretical notions were mentioned, the psychoneur-
omuscular theory and the central representation theory. If
the psychoneuromuscular theory would be valid, it was
expected that even novice learners, the absolute-zero
subjects, would be able to learn a totally novel movement
by means of mental practice, since mental practice would
lead to activation of the involved target muscle. However,
in both experiments no EMG activity in the m. abductor
hallucis of the right as well as the left foot could be
obtained during mental practice. Furthermore, the results
of experiment 1 showed that only subjects who physically
practiced the task improved their ability to abduct the big
toe voluntarily. The absolute-zero subjects, who mentally
practiced the task, did not improve. In experiment 2 all
subjects who practiced the target movement improved
their toe-abduction skill. Physical practice as well as
mental practice led to improvement.
Hence, the results seem to indicate that it is not possible
to explain the effects of mental practice in terms of a
bottom-up mechanism. Indeed, it seemed that the subjects
in the MP groups did not receive any information from
target muscles. Neither does it seem plausible that the
failure of the MP group in experiment 1 to improve their
toe-abduction skill was due to the fact that the training
sessions were too short. Most studies report training
periods shorter than the 20 min we employed in our
experiment (see Feltz and Landers 1983; Driskell et al.
1994). Driskell et al. (1994) and Feltz and Landers (1983)
have found the largest effects after interventions of
approximately 20 min. Therefore, the length of the
training sessions in both experiments should be long
enough to show at least some improvement.
It seems, therefore, more plausible to explain the effects
of mental practice in terms of a top-down mechanism.
Recall that the central representation theory would predict
that absolute-zero subjects would profit from physical
practice but not from mental practice, since no stored
representation could be activated. Only subjects with some
experience in the task would be able to improve their skill.
The results seem to support this expectation. Indeed, only
the already-doing-it subjects profited from mental practice.
After two training sessions, they were able to improve the
abduction of their big toe significantly, whereas subjects
without knowledge of how to execute the movement
(absolute-zero subjects) were not able to improve the
abduction movement by means of mental practice.
The results of the present study are in line with the
findings of Yue and Cole (1992) as mentioned in the
Introduction. Recall that they argue that the obtained
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Fig. 2 Mean ROM scores of the already-doing-it subjects,
measured on the pre- and posttests of sessions 1 and 2 and on the
preexperimental measurement 1 week before the experiment started
Table 2 Differences in ROM of
the already-doing-it subjects at
pretest before session 1 and at
posttest after session 2
Group Start of training End of training ROM
N Mean ROM SD Mean ROM SD Post-pre df t P
Mental practice 13 6.0 2.6 7.7 2.8 +1.7 12 –4.95 0.00
Physical practice 14 7.1 2.7 10.1 3.0 +3.0 13 –5.84 0.00
Control 13 5.9 1.5 6.0 1.6 +0.1 12 0.47 0.65
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training results after mental practice cannot be attributed to
neural changes at the execution level, but should be
explained in terms of changes at the planning and
programming level of the motor system. Hence, it seems
that mental practice leads to improvement only when a
representation of the target movement is present. In other
words, the data suggest that motor imagery results from
the utilization of stored representations of action. As
Crammond (1997) has argued, motor imagery is some-
thing other than creative imagination.
The absolute-zero subjects were not able to use motor
imagery for improving toe abduction because they did not
have a representation for that movement. That makes them
different from patients who, due to a lesion, are no longer
able to perform specific movements but very often retain
the ability to imagine these movements accurately (John-
son 2000; Johnson et al. 2002).
The conclusion that we can mentally train only those
movements that we have performed before is important,
because it may restrict the use of mental practice in
neurological rehabilitation and sports to movement
categories that have been performed earlier.
There is a final problem that deserves discussion. The
problem refers to a more or less fundamental pitfall in
motor imagery. Indeed, after the instruction to imagine a
certain movement, no possibility exists to control whether
subjects are doing what you ask them to do. This, indeed,
is a peculiar situation for experimental research, where the
dependent variable has to be controlled as rigidly as
possible.
This methodological shortcoming, however, should not
be overrated, since a substantial number of neuroimaging
studies show that motor imagery results in the activation
of brain areas that are directly related to the imagined
movement, so that we have some certainty that the
instruction to imagine a movement, indeed, leads to the
desired cognitive act (see Jeannerod 1994; Naito et al.
2002; Gerardin et al. 2000; Crammond 1997; Porro et al.
1996)
The present experiments deliver further evidence for the
hypothesis that imagery and movement execution share
common neural mechanisms. Indeed, the improvement of
the toe-abduction movement by motor imagery in the
already-doing-it group without activating the target muscle
underscores the role central mechanisms may play in
bringing about this result. The absence of any peripheral
activation seems to rule out a completely neuromuscular or
afference-based peripheral explanation. This preliminary
conclusion, however, has to be tested in further studies.
This study should be read as a modest attempt to
unravel the underlying causal mechanisms of mental
practice. Much, however, remains unclear. Future research
should be focused on finding more evidence for a central
control mechanism. An interesting next step is to answer
the question of whether the acquired toe-abduction skill
would generalize to the left (untrained) foot as would be
predicted when mental practice leads to the strengthening
of a motor program. Brain-mapping techniques seem
necessary to gain more insight into the differences in
cortical activation between the absolute-zero subjects and
already-doing-it subjects and how the cortical activation
changes during (mental) practice sessions.
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